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In recent decades, religion and politics have become linked more
than ever before.' The Supreme Court has permitted programs
providing federal funds to religious organizations that would have
been struck down in the 1970s and early 1980s.2 Religion's influence
on politics was perhaps at its highest in the 2000 presidential
campaign. Both former Vice President Al Gore and President
George W. Bush supported a greater role for faith-based
organizations in delivering social services.3 In his Inaugural Address,
President Bush announced: "Church and charity, synagogue and
mosque, lend our communities their humanity and they will have an
honored place in our plans and in our laws."4 This goal of giving
religion an "honored place in our.., laws" has taken the form of
President Bush's charitable choice initiative: federal funding of faith-
based organizations that provide community services. Methods of
*The author graduated cum laude with a J.D. from the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law in May 2003. She graduated cum laude with a B.A. in political science
from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2000.
1. Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., Article: Faith-Based Charities and
the Quest to Solve America's Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 265,265-66 (2001).
2. Compare Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (permitting New York City to
send public school teachers to parochial schools to provide remedial education to
underprivileged children) with Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (barring New York
City from sending public school teachers to parochial schools to provide remedial
education to underprivileged children).
3. Soloman & Vlissides, supra note 1, at 277.
4. President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2001).
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achieving this goal have taken the form of Executive Orders and
congressional action
As benevolent as this federal program is-aiding those who aid
others-it is not without drawbacks. Most importantly, the charitable
choice initiative may violate the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. Before reaching this question, it is important to understand
the background of charitable choice and the Establishment Clause
constitutional framework. Only then can the constitutional rules be
applied to the charitable choice legislation. Only then will it become
clear that the program runs afoul of the First Amendment.
I. Background to the Charitable Choice Initiative
President Bush announced: "We must encourage and support
the work of charities and faith-based and community groups that
offer help and love one person at a time. (Applause)... Government
should welcome these groups to apply for funds, not discriminate
against them."6 The history of charitable choice legislation pre-dates
President Bush's inauguration. The model for charitable choice
legislation first appeared in the 1996 Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) legislation.7 The law allows states to administer
TANF services through nongovernmental organizations or through
vouchers or certificates redeemable by private organizations.8 If a
state chooses to implement the TANF program in this manner, it
must allow religious organizations to participate, subject to the
requirements of charitable choice.'
Since the enactment of TANF, Congress has enacted into law
three other charitable choice measures.'" In 1997, the welfare-to-work
grant program was added to TANF." In 1998, Congress reauthorized
5. For a discussion of Executive Orders 13,199 and 13,198, see Soloman and
Vlissides, supra note 1, at 265. For a discussion of H.R. 7, the Community Solutions Act
of 2001, see David M. Ackerman, CRS Report for Congress, Public Aid and Faith-Based
Organizations (Charitable Choice): Background and Selected Legal Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 9-15 (updated Aug. 23, 2001) (on file with author). For a
discussion of S.1924, see The Charity Aid, Recovery And Empowerment ("CARE") Act
of 2002, (Feb. 7, 2002) available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/-lieberman/press/02/02/
2002207716.html.
6. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 27, 2001).
7. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.
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the "Community Services Block Grant Program" and included
selected charitable choice provisions in the legislation.'2 In 2000,
Congress added charitable choice to the substance abuse treatment
and prevention services provided under the grant provisions of Titles
V and XIX of the Public Health Services Act.'3 In 2001, the House of
Representatives adopted H.R. 7, the Community Solutions Act of
2001, by a 233-198 vote." The Senate never voted on this bill.'5 On
February 8, 2002, Senators Joseph I. Lieberman and Rick Santorum
introduced in the Senate the Charity Aid, Recovery, and
Empowerment Act of 2002.16 This "compromise" legislation left out
the controversial issues surrounding federally funded religion that
were present in the House bill.'7 The Senate bill failed in the last days
of the 107th Congress. 18 The CARE Act of 2003 was introduced in
the Senate by Senators Grassley, Santorum and Leiberman, on
January 30, 2003.9 In the executive branch, President Bush issued an
executive order which "directed federal agencies to treat religious
and secular charities equally when awarding money" in December of
2002."0 In his State of the Union Address in January of 2003, he again
asked Congress to pass his faith-based initiative.2'
The intent behind charitable choice legislation is to ensure that
religious organizations can apply to participate in federally funded
social programs.22 Charitable choice allows them to provide social
12. Id.
13. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 8.
14. Id. at 13.
15. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d107:l:./temp/-bdLAc8:@@@L&summ2=m&l/bss/dlO7query.htmll.
16. S. 1924, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
binlbdquery/z?d107:SN01924:@@@L&summ2=m&.
17. TIA: Lieberman-Santorum Faith-Based Initiative Bill Is 'Compromise'; Bill Still
Has To Be Conferenced With Divisive HR 7, (U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 8,2002).
18. CRS Report for Congress, Charitable Choice, Faith-Based Initiatives, and TANF,
at 4 (updated Jan. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
19. S. 256, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.oc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c108:S.256:. The CARE Act of 2003 is described as "[a] bill to provide incentives for
charitable contributions by individuals and businesses, to improve the public disclosure of
activities of exempt organizations, and to enhance the ability of low-income Americans to
gain financial security by building assets, and for other purposes." Id.
20. Dana Milbank, 'Faith' Initiative Revived, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 2002, at A3.
21. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2003).
22. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 3.
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services without having to abandon their religious character.23 There
are three basic provisions of charitable choice legislation: (1)
provisions protecting the religious character of organizations; (2)
provisions protecting the religious freedom of program beneficiaries;
and (3) provisions protecting the constitutionality of charitable
choice.24
First, to protect the religious character of faith-based
organizations that wish to participate in federally funded social
programs, the government cannot discriminate against an applicant
for funding because of religion.25 Faith-based organizations that
receive funding can remain independent of government control.26
They retain control over aspects of their religion such as the
definition, expression, and practice.2 ' The government cannot require
such organizations to change their internal governance or remove
religious symbols from their property.28  Finally, faith-based
organizations that receive federal funding may discriminate on
religious grounds in employment. 2' This preempts state and local
discrimination laws.3" This is the primary difference between the bill
passed by the House of Representatives and the recent Charity Aid,
Recovery, and Empowerment Act introduced in the Senate.3
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3-4.






31. Bumiller, supra note 15. See also Common Questions About the CARE Act,
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/l-ieberman/press/02/02/
2002207720.html; and Statement of Senator Joe Lieberman on the Introduction of the
Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) Act, (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://liberman.senate.gov/M-ieberman/press/02/02/2002207724.html. Senator Lieberman
repeatedly has stated that the Senate legislation does not contain "charitable choice"
provisions. The primary difference, however, between the two pieces of legislation is the
ability or inability of religious organizations to discriminate in hiring. Despite that
difference, the Lieberman bill does contain many similar provisions to H.R. 7. Senator
Lieberman seems to define "charitable choice" more narrowly than others. See
Ackerman, supra note 5, at 3. In pertinent part, S.1924 Sec. 301 provides:
GENERAL AUTHORITY - For any social program, a nongovernmental organization
that is (or applying to be) involved in the delivery of social services for the program shall
not be required -
(1) to alter or remove art, icons, scripture, or other symbols, or to alter its name, because
the symbols or name are religious;
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:1
Second, to protect the religious freedom of beneficiaries of
federally funded social programs, faith-based organizations cannot
discriminate against a beneficiary based on religious belief or lack
thereof." For each federally funded program, there must be an
alternate provider of services available to any beneficiary who objects
to a religious organization providing those services.33  The
government must give notice of this right to beneficiaries. 4 Finally, if
a faith-based organization receives direct public aid, participation in
religious activities on the part of beneficiaries must be voluntary.35 If
aid is indirect, such as vouchers or tax exemptions, it is irrelevant
whether participation is voluntary or involuntary.36
Third, provisions of the charitable choice initiative seek to
protect its constitutionality. 7 Faith-based organizations are barred
from using federal aid for sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.38 Additionally, each federally funded social program
is required to be implemented in a manner "consistent with" the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 9
Some religiously affiliated organizations already receive federal
funding for social programs."0 Examples of such organizations are the
Salvation Army, United Jewish Communities, Catholic Charities
USA, etc." Generally, these organizations are required to be secular
in nature to receive funds.42 They must remove religious symbols
from the premises and worship, instruction, and proselytizing are
forbidden.43 The difference between these already existing programs
and President Bush's charitable choice initiative is that charitable
(2) to alter or remove provisions in its chartering documents because the provisions are
religious... ;
(3) to alter or remove religious qualifications for membership on its governing boards.
S.1924 Sec. 301, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?cl07:1:./temp/-cl07Keo
Dhr:e70762:.
32. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 3.
33. Id.








42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
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choice allows faith-based organizations to participate in federally
funded social programs and retain their religious character."
II. Constitutional Framework
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. '"" There is virtually no
caselaw that determines whether federal funding of social services
violates the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has
considered federal funding of social services provided by religious
institutions only twice in this country's history and only once in the
last century. 6 Neither of those two cases help determine whether
charitable choice is unconstitutional.
In Bradfield v. Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the
appropriation by Congress of money to fund two hospitals in the
District of Columbia, one of which was managed by members of the
Catholic Church, did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Bradfield does not provide much guidance in the question of
charitable choice for two reasons. First, decided in 1899, the opinion
was written long before modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence
was developed. Second, the Court relied on the fact that Providence
Hospital was a secular corporation that happened to be managed by
people who adhered to the Catholic faith.48 The Court stated: "there
is nothing sectarian in the corporation." 9  Charitable choice is
distinguishable from the appropriations bill in Bradfield because it
does fund sectarian institutions.
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Supreme Court held that the
Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") did not violate the
Establishment Clause." The AFLA provided grants to public or non-
profit private organizations to care for pregnant adolescents and
provide services to prevent adolescent sexual relations.5' The Act
44. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 5.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899).
47. 175 U.S. at 295-97.
48. Id. at 298-99.
49. Id. at 299.
50. 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988).
51. Id. at 593-94.
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allowed grants to go to religious and charitable organizations. 5 2 The
Court held that the AFLA did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the law did not indicate that a "significant proportion of the
federal funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian'
institutions."53 Charitable choice is distinguishable from the AFLA
because federal funds will be disbursed to "pervasively sectarian"
institutions.' That is the goal of charitable choice: to allow sectarian
organizations to provide social services without having to relinquish
their religious characteristics.
A. Separation Theory v. Neutrality Theory
Because neither Bradfield nor Bowen provides much guidance in
the charitable choice analysis, we must start from scratch. In recent
history, there have been two dominant theories regarding the
prohibitions of the Establishment Clause; the separation theory and
the neutrality theory." The separation theory is that of strict
separation between government and religion. 6 Proponents of this
theory adhere to the metaphor that a wall should separate church and
state. 7 In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court stated:
"The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable."" The rationale
behind this theory is that strict separation is necessary to protect
religious liberty. 9 When religion becomes a part of government,
there is inevitable coercion to participate in that faith.' Nevertheless,
under the separation theory, government can fund a religious
organization as long as the secular and sectarian elements can be
separated such that the government only funds the secular elements.6'
The neutrality theory says that the government must be neutral
toward religion.62  It cannot favor religion over secularism.63  In
52. Id. at 595.
53. Id. at 610.
54. Discussion infra Part III.B.d.




58. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 978.
60. Id.
61. Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 1, at 283.
62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 978.
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Supreme Court stated: "We have held that the guarantee of
neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones,
are broad and diverse."' This is based upon the theory that if public
funding is distributed in a neutral way, then it is less likely to advance
religion.6 For the most part, the Supreme Court has invoked the
neutrality theory in cases involving the private expression of religious
66views. Most recently, the neutrality theory was invoked to uphold
an Ohio school voucher program."
Proponents of the neutrality theory advocate application of the
"symbolic endorsement" test.68  The government violates the
Establishment Clause if it symbolically endorses a particular religion
or if it generally endorses either religion or secularism.69 "Where the
government's operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing
religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively
encourages that result, the Establishment Clause is violated."'7 The
neutrality theory received the support of a majority of Supreme Court
Justices for the first time in Simmons-Harris.7'
63. Id.
64. 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
65. Jonathon Friedman, Student Research, Charitable Choice and the Establishment
Clause, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 103,109 (1997) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 231 (1997)).
66. Id. The neutrality theory was invoked in the free speech context in Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a university could not exclude religious student
groups from using school facilities); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that a school district could not exclude an
evangelical church from using a school auditorium to show religiously based films); and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding that the university could not withhold funding of a student publication because
the publication was religious). According to Friedman, the neutrality theory was invoked
outside of the free speech context in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S.
1 (1993) (holding that public funding of a sign-language interpreter to accompany a deaf
student to Catholic high school did not violate the Establishment Clause).
67. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
68. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 978.
69. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
70. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2467. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at
984.
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B. The Lemon-Agostini Test
The government violates the Establishment Clause if it
discriminates among religious groups. For example, granting tax
exemptions to only Christian churches would violate the
Establishment Clause. If a law is not discriminatory, it may still
violate the Establishment Clause. Historically, to determine this,
courts have applied the three-prong test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.3
A law is unconstitutional if it fails any prong of the test. 4 "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."'75
The Lemon test was modified by Agostini v. Felton." The
Agostini Court determined that excessive entanglement is an aspect
of the second prong-the inquiry into the statute's primary effect.7
This is because the factors considered to determine whether
entanglement is "excessive" are similar to those used to determine
whether the primary effect of a statute is to advance or inhibit
religion. The Court stated:
to assess entanglement, we have looked to "the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authority." Similarly, we
have assessed a law's 'effect' by examining the character of the
institutions benefited and the nature of the aid that the State
provided 9
Due to the similarities in these assessments, the Agostini Court
consolidated the second and third prongs of the Lemon test into one.80
The criteria used by the Agostini Court in the "effects" inquiry were:
whether the statute results in government indoctrination; whether it
defines recipients by reference to religion; or whether it creates
excessive entanglement.
8 1
72. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989).
73. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
75. Id. at 613.
76. 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
77. Id. at 232.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,615 (1971)).
80. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000).
81. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
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The resulting Lemon-Agostini test addresses four questions: (1)
whether the law has a secular purpose; (2) whether it results in
government indoctrination; (3) whether it defines participants by
reference to religion; and (4) whether it creates excessive
entanglement.82 The application of this revised test is not entirely
clear. In Mitchell v. Helms, the Court explained that "in Agostini we
modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools."'83 Thus, it
is not clear that the Supreme Court would apply the modified Lemon-
Agostini test if it were to consider the charitable choice legislation.
Rather, the fact that the Mitchell Court specifically stated that the
Agostini modification was for the purpose of schools might imply that
the Supreme Court never intended for it to be applied to any other
cases. If this is true, the Lemon test would be the proper test to apply
to charitable choice.
Each of the four factors used in the Lemon and Agostini tests are
tests in their own right. First, a statute must have a secular legislative
purpose. ' This is, generally, the easiest of the factors for a statute to
meet."' Governmental assistance programs tend to survive this prong,
even if they may not survive the other requirements of Lemon or
Agostini.86 Mueller v. Allen explains that this is because the Supreme
Court is reluctant "to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program
may be discerned from the face of the statute., 87 Nevertheless, this is
still one of the requirements that a statute must meet in order to pass
constitutional muster.
The second factor of the Lemon-Agostini test is whether the law
results in government indoctrination.8 The key to distinguishing
between religious indoctrination by the state or indoctrination not by
the state is neutrality.89 Aid that is offered to a wide range of people
without regard to religion is generally upheld. 90 "If the religious,
irreligious, and areligious[sic] are all alike eligible for governmental
82. Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 966 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
83. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807.
84. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
85. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 966 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
89. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000).
90. Id.
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aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government." 9'
To assure neutrality on the part of the government, the Supreme
Court has considered whether aid that goes to a religious organization
does so as a result of the independent and private choices made by
individuals. 2 This has been a particularly important question when
courts deal with aid to religious schools.93
Third, a statute must not define participants by reference to
religion.94 In ascertaining this factor, courts ask "whether the criteria
for allocating the aid 'create a financial incentive to undertake
religious indoctrination."'95 The Agostini Court said that this financial
incentive is not present when aid is distributed based on "neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a
nondiscriminatory basis."' The purpose behind questioning whether
aid creates a financial incentive to subject oneself to indoctrination is
to determine whether a private choice to participate in a program is
truly independent.97
Finally, both the Lemon and Agostini tests question whether a
statute leads to excessive entanglement between government and
religion.98 To determine whether entanglement is excessive, a court
will examine the character of the institutions to be benefited, the
nature of the aid provided by the state, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious organization." A law
violates the Establishment Clause when it requires "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance. '"'00 Thus, if a
federally funded social program provided by a religious organization
requires continued monitoring by the government to ensure that the
program is consistent with the Establishment Clause, there might be
an excessive entanglement between government and religion. Apart
91. Id.
92. Id. at 810.
93. Id.
94. Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F.Supp.2d 950, 966 (W.D. Wis
2002).
95. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 813 (2000) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 231 (1997)).
96. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
97. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814.
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,613 (1971); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
99. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
100. Id. at 619.
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from specific entanglements, government assistance to religious
organizations violates the Establishment Clause if it carries with it the
potential for continuing political strife over aid to religion.'°'
C. Other "Effects" Test Factors
In addition to the "effects" factors listed in Agostini, the
Supreme Court has considered coercion and endorsement as
elements of whether a program has the primary effect of advancing
religion. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court first articulated coercion as
part of the effects prong of the Lemon test."°0 The Court stated: "at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith or tends to do So. '''103 The Court reiterated this rule in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe4 This is significant because
Santa Fe was decided in 2000, three years after Agostini modified the
Lemon test. The Court in Santa Fe focused almost exclusively on the
issue of coercion, but did briefly address the Lemon test.' The Court
did not address the Agostini modification of the Lemon test. Thus,
Agostini clearly did not overrule Lemon.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor interpreted the "effects"
prong of the Lemon test to be a question of whether a program
constitutes a government endorsement of religion.' 6 There are two
prongs to Justice O'Connor's endorsement test: 1) the purpose or
intent of the policy or act, and 2) the effect of the action.' 7 In her
concurring opinion in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette, Justice O'Connor explained that the question of
governmental endorsement of religion should be judged from the
point of view of "the hypothetical observer.""'8 Would a reasonable
101. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
102. Carmen M. Guerricagoitia, Feature, Innovation Does Not Cure Constitutional
Violation: Charitable Choice And The Establishment Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 447, 465 (2001).
103. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668,678 (1984)).
104. 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587) (holding that a high school
policy of having a student elected student council chaplain deliver a prayer before each
home varsity football game violated the Establishment Clause).
105. Id. at 314.
106. 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Guerricagoitia, supra note 102, at 468-69.
108. Id. at 470 (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
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observer see a specific special treatment of religion as an
endorsement of religion?"° In Books v. City of Elkart, Indiana, the
Seventh Circuit explained that in more recent cases, the Supreme
Court has, on occasion, considered the first two prongs of the Lemon
test as an "endorsement" test." ' Similarly, in Destefano v. Emergency
Housing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit stated that the endorsement
inquiry has been subsumed within the Lemon-Agostini test in recent
Supreme Court cases."' The Second Circuit read those decisions as
casting doubt upon the vitality of the endorsement test as a stand-
alone measure of constitutionality."'
The final "effects" factor that the Supreme Court historically
considered is the question of whether a religious institution is
"pervasively sectarian." In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court stated that
a statute might have the effect of advancing religion if the aid goes to
"pervasively sectarian" institutions."3  A "pervasively sectarian"
institution is one that cannot separate its sectarian activities from the
secular."4  However, in Mitchell, the Court stated that the
"pervasively sectarian" factor was no longer relevant. "5
Unfortunately for constitutional law scholars who seek a clear-
cut approach to Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court
made its jurisprudence even more confusing with its decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 6 There, the majority opinion invoked
the neutrality theory to uphold a school voucher system which
permitted the use of state-funded vouchers at private religious
schools."7 The Court stated that:
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
765 (1995)).
109. Id.
110. 235 F.3d 292, 301-02 (7th Cir. 2000). The court cited County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), and Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), as examples.
111. 247 F.3d 397,410-11 (2d Cir. 2001).
112. Id.
113. 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988).
114. Friedman, supra note 65, at 115.
115. 530 U.S. 793, 826 (2000).
116. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
117. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460,2467 (2002).
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Establishment Clause. "8
The majority opinion did not articulate that it was analyzing the
voucher program under the Lemon-Agostini factors, making it
difficult to determine whether that test is still applicable to
Establishment Clause cases. However, the majority seemed to
employ the Agostini test, without saying so. The Court stated that the
voucher program was created with a valid secular purpose-
improving the school system in Ohio."9 Consequently, all that needed
to be considered was whether the program had the effect of
advancing religion.20 Thus, it appears that the majority opinion uses
neutrality as a factor in determining whether the program has the
primary effect of advancing religion. Moreover, Justice O'Connor, in
her concurring opinion, specifically stated that the Court's decision in
Simmons-Harris was not a departure from precedent, indicating that
the Lemon-Agostini test has not been overruled. 2' She explained that
when addressing the primary effects prong in an indirect aid case,
courts must consider two factors.'22 First, courts must consider
whether the program is administered neutrally, "without
differentiation based on the religious status of beneficiaries or
providers of services.', 2 3  Second, courts must determine whether
beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice between religious
and nonreligious providers.'24 If the answer to either of these
questions is no, then the government program violates the
Establishment Clause.'25
Because the Supreme Court has not articulated a single,
consistent test for all Establishment Clause cases, it is difficult to
determine which factors are the most important when attempting to
analyze the constitutionality of charitable choice. For the purposes of
this Note, I will consider the constitutionality of charitable choice in
light of all of these factors. I will analyze the charitable choice
legislation under the two prongs of the Lemon-Agostini test: secular
purpose and effects. Under the effects prong, I will consider the three
Agostini criteria, as well as the coercion, endorsement, and neutrality
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2465.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2473 (O'Connor, J., concurring).






III. Analysis Under the Lemon-Agostini Test
A. Secular Purpose
The first prong of both the Lemon '26 and Agostini.27 tests is
whether the law has a secular purpose. While courts generally give
deference to legislatures, the duty of the courts is to "distinguish[] a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one. ' ' 118 An act can have a
religious purpose, as long as it is not the primary purpose, and a true
secular purpose exists. 29 To determine whether a secular purpose
does exist, the statute, legislative history and statements of the
sponsor should be considered.3 '
Charitable choice legislation seems to have a legitimate secular
purpose: providing social services to those in need. The very first
purpose listed in the purposes section of H.R. 7 is "to provide
assistance to individuals and families in need in the most effective and
efficient manner.""' The stated purpose of S. 1924 is "to tap into
America's renewed spirit of unity, community and responsibility in
the wake of September 11th to better respond to pressing social
problems and ultimately help more people in need.' 3 2  Because
courts give much deference to legislatures, a court would most likely
find that charitable choice has a legitimate secular purpose.
B. "Effects" Test
1. Agostini criteria
As discussed above, the Agostini Court consolidated the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test into one because the factors used
to determine whether a statute had the primary effect of advancing
religion were similar to those used to determine if it created an
126. 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
127. 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
128. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
129. Geurricagoitia, supra note 102, at 461.
130. Id.
131. Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 1994A(b) (2001).
132. The Charity Aid, Recovery And Empowerment ("CARE") Act of 2002 (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://lierberman.senate.gov/-lieberman/press/02/02/2002207716.html.
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excessive governmental entanglement with religion.' The resulting
criteria used by the Agostini Court in the "effects" inquiry were: 1)
whether the statute results in government indoctrination; 2) whether
it defines recipients by reference to religion; or 3) whether it creates
excessive entanglement."3 If a law runs afoul of any of these criteria,
then it has the primary effect of advancing religion.'35
a. Does it result in government indoctrination?
Charitable choice programs must not result in government
indoctrination.3 6 There are two prongs of an inquiry into government
indoctrination: whether the public funding constitutes or results in
indoctrination and whether the indoctrination is attributable to the
government.37
First, one might like to believe that religious organizations that
receive federal funds to provide social services to those in need will
refrain from preaching to the beneficiaries of the social programs.
Certainly, many organizations will respect the notions of religious
liberty and simply provide services. However, those organizations are
already entitled to federal funding, without the help of charitable
choice . 3  The charitable choice initiative will provide federal funding
to those organizations that do not already receive it because they do
not refrain from indoctrination. Thus, the extension of funding to
more faith-based organizations will likely result in indoctrination.
Furthermore, there is evidence that some groups will use the
opportunity to provide social services as an opportunity to
indoctrinate. Two of the more outspoken opponents of President
Bush's charitable choice initiative are leaders of the religious right,
founder and former president of the Christian Coalition Pat
Robertson and Reverend Jerry Falwell. They oppose federal funding
of non-traditional religions.'39 Of course, the government cannot
133. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
134. Id. at 234.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 414 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226).
138. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 4.
139. See, e.g., Kathy A. Gambrell, Bush Gives $1B in Homeless Assistance, UNITED
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 20, 2001 ("Conservative religious leaders such as Pat
Robertson... expressed concern organizations such as Elijah Mohammed's Nation of
Islam might apply for and receive federal monies."); David Jackson, Taking Hits from the
Left and the Right: It Isn't Easy Being Point Man on Faith-Based Initiatives, DALLAS
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discriminate against religions without violating the Establishment
Clause. ' More importantly, though, Robertson and Falwell oppose
funding of non-traditional religions because they disagree with what
they teach. For example, Robertson expressed concern that the
Church of Scientology will use federal funding to expand its
Narconon drug treatment plan' 1  He is also concerned about "plans
by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church to promote its
sexual abstinence programs in public schools with government
funds.' 4' Falwell stated on the website Beliefnet.com: "The Muslim
faith teaches hate.' 43
The problem that Robertson and Falwell have with the
charitable choice initiative is that other, "non-traditional", religions
will be able to use federal funds to indoctrinate. This indicates that
they either believe that indoctrination is permitted under the
charitable choice initiative, or that it will not be regulated effectively.
This suggests that the religious groups Robertson and Falwell
represent will also practice indoctrination. After all, CNBC's Chris
Matthews quoted Robertson's comments in the Wall Street Journal,
saying:
"If government provides funding to the thousands of faith-
based institutions, but, under a tortured definition of separation
of church and state, demands in return that those institutions
give up their unique religious activities, then not only the
effectiveness of those institutions but possibly their very"
reason to be may... be lost.'"
Thus, their religious organizations should not have to give up
MORNING NEWS, May 12, 2001, at 1G ("Evangelists Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell
complained that groups such as the Hare Krishnas or the Church of Scientology would
also be eligible for grants."); and Megan Twohey, Limelight Scorching 'Charitable
Choice'?, NAT'L J., Apr. 28, 2001 ("[F]undamentalist evangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat
Robertson, .. . have criticized the idea of government funding for religious groups outside
the nation's Judeo-Christian mainstream.").
140. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989).
141. Don Lattin, Faith-Based Welfare Puzzles Televangelist, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 22,
2001, at Al.
142. Id.
143. Don Lattin, Bush Courts Right To Back Program, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2001, at
A4. See also Hardball With Chris Matthews: President Bush's Office of Faith-Based
Action (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 12, 2001) (transcript on file with CNBC News
Transcripts) ("Islam should be out the door before they knock.").
144. Hardball With Chris Matthews: President Bush's Office of Faith-Based Action
(CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 12, 2001) (transcript on file with CNBC News
Transcripts).
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their "unique religious activities, '  but non-traditional religions
should. The fact that leaders of the religious right fear that other
religions will use federal funds to indoctrinate indicates that their
groups also plan to indoctrinate, because to refrain to do so would be
to lose their "very reason to be. 146
Governmental indoctrination requires "some nexus between the
disputed government action and the resulting indoctrination, beyond
the bare existence of a causal relationship between the two. ' 147 It is
unlikely that the mere presence of a publicly paid social worker on
the premises of a religious institution will raise a presumption of
indoctrination.'48 Something else is required to establish the link
between indoctrination and the government. The prevailing view of
the Supreme Court is Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Mitchell.'49 She explained that although "neutrality is important,"
more central is the principle that "actual diversion of government aid
to religious indoctrination" is constitutionally suspect.'5 ° Following
Justice O'Connor's view, in DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group,
Inc., the Second Circuit found that if public funds paid staff salaries
and staff read religious texts and showed religious videos, then the
indoctrination would be attributable to the government. 5' The court
explained that if staff members just encouraged beneficiaries to go to
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings (which have been found to be a
religious activity),"2 there was no indoctrination.'53 However, if the
staff was successful in encouraging clients to go to meetings, then
there was indoctrination.'54
Application of the Mitchell and DeStefano analyses indicates that
the charitable choice initiative will result in government
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 416 (2d Cir. 2001).
148. See Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 363 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) for the conclusion that the presence of a publicly paid teacher on a
sectarian school premises will not raise a presumption of indoctrination).
149. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 418.
150. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837-40 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
Mitchell, Justice Thomas wrote that as long as aid is neutral, meaning it is '"offered to a
broad range of groups ... without regard to their religion," indoctrination is not
attributable to the government. Id. at 809.
151. 247 F.3d at 419.
152. Id. at 406 (citing Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cit.
1997).
153. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 416 (2d Cir. 2001).
154. Id.
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indoctrination. If federal funds are used to pay staff salaries and the
staff uses spiritual approaches to provide social services, then there
would be an "actual diversion of government aid to religious
indoctrination." Moreover, if faith-based organizations are successful
at what they do, then their indoctrination of beneficiaries will amount
to governmental indoctrination. For the purposes of this note, I will
assume that faith-based organizations will be successful, because if
the government assumes that they will be unsuccessful, and therefore
indoctrination will not be attributable to the government, then there
is no point for the legislation anyway. Additionally, it is likely that
faith-based organizations will be successful in encouraging recipients
to participate in religious activities because recipients may be
pressured to do so. '55 If a beneficiary is invited to participate by the
person overseeing his or her benefits, it might be difficult to decline.'56
Steven K. Green, in Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory,
correctly points out that the government provides a captive audience
to faith-based organizations.
157
It is worth noting that if government aid takes the form of non-
ideological aid, such as food, blankets, or medication, then it will be
less likely to result in government indoctrination. In Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, the Court distinguished employing
a sign language interpreter from a teacher or guidance counselor.'58
Because the Court upheld the interpreter, the decision implies that a
teacher or guidance counselor would be impermissible. In his
dissenting opinion in Bowen, Justice Blackmun explained that the
Court time and again has recognized the "difficulties inherent in
asking even the best-intentioned individuals in such positions to make
4a total separation between secular teaching and religious
doctrine.'' '.. 9 He said that there is a difference between running a
soup kitchen or hospital and counseling pregnant teenagers."s The
risk of advancing religion is greater where the intent of the program is
to change behavior than where it is to distribute medication, food, or
155. Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 33, 45-46 (2000).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 46.
158. 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971)
(stating "teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral").
159. 487 U.S. 589, 638 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
160. Id. at 641.
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shelter.' 6' Thus, if government aid pays the salaries of staff members
of faith-based organizations, then there is a good chance the aid could
result in government indoctrination. If the aid is provided as direct
cash subsidies that could be used for any purpose, then it can result in
government indoctrination.' 62  However, if the government only
provides such nonmonetary and verifiably secular aid as food,
medication, blankets, etc., then the aid will not result in impermissible
government indoctrination.
163
b. Does it define participants by reference to religion?
Charitable choice must not define participants by reference to
religion." What this means is that the charitable choice initiative
must not "create a financial incentive to undertake religious
indoctrination.' 6' The Agostini Court stated this rule as follows:
This incentive is not present... where the aid is allocated on
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor
disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Under such
circumstances, the aid is less likely to have the effect of
advancing religion.'66
In other words, a recipient must have a choice in whether he or
she wants to receive benefits from a faith-based organization. That
choice must be truly independent. If there is some sort of financial
incentive to choose the religious organization over a secular one, then
the choice is not truly independent and the program may have the
effect of advancing religion.
In Mitchell, the Court concluded that the program at issue did
not define participants by reference to religion.' 67 The program was a
school aid program known as Chapter 2.'" The federal government
distributed funds to state and local governmental agencies who then
would lend educational materials to public and private schools.'69 The
161. Id.
162. Id. at 634.
163. Id.
164. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 966
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
165. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (quoting Witters v. Washington
Dep't. of Servs. For Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
166. Id.
167. 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000).
168. Id. at 801.
169. Id.
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amount of aid was determined by the student enrollment at each
participating school."' The Court concluded that the program did not
define participants by reference to religion because aid was "allocated
on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor[ed] nor
disfavor[ed] religion, and [was] made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.... The Court
reasoned that because aid was distributed on a per capita basis and
allocations to private schools had to be equal to allocations to public
schools, the funding did not create an improper incentive."' This
suggests that if President Bush's charitable choice initiative is
implemented in such a way that federal funding of religious
organizations is dependent on the number of beneficiaries they serve
- rather than payment of a lump sum-and the funding of faith-based
organizations and secular charities is equal, then the program would
not be deemed to define recipients based on religion.
Similarly, in Helms v. Picard, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of a Louisiana special education program that said
that the state would provide free, publicly supported education to
every exceptional child.7 The court concluded that the program did
not define recipients based on religion because the students would
have received special education in the public schools.' This suggests
that if beneficiaries receive the same benefits from a faith-based
organization as they would from a secular organization, then the
program will not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
Because this Agostini criterion stresses whether private choices
to participate in a program are truly independent, whether aid is
direct or indirect is relevant. Direct aid is either money or materials
given by the government directly to the faith-based organization. In
contrast, indirect aid is aid that is given to the beneficiary and then
indirectly reaches the faith-based organization. Examples of indirect
aid are tax benefits and vouchers. 76 Constitutional rules for indirect
aid to religious organizations are more lenient than rules for direct
170. Id.
171. Id. at 829 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997)).
172. Id. at 829-30.
173. 151 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1998).
174. Id. at 366.
175. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 814 (2000).
176. David M. Ackerman, CRS Report for Congress, Public Aid and Faith-Based
Organizations (Charitable Choice): Background Selected Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 26 (updated Aug. 23, 2001) (on file with author).
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aid, because the funding reaches the religious organization only
through the private choices of individuals. For example, while direct
aid is limited to secular uses, indirect aid can be used for all functions,
not just secular functions. '77 Furthermore, all of the Justices in
Mitchell seemed to doubt that direct monetary aid can pass
constitutional muster.17 The rationale behind the different treatment
of the two kinds of aid is that if aid goes to religious organizations
because of the choices of individuals, then the government is not
advancing religion.
If charitable choice provides direct aid to religious organizations,
it is much more likely that there will be a financial incentive for
beneficiaries to subject themselves to religious indoctrination.
Although the government cannot force individuals to receive social
services from religious institutions, the choices of individuals might
not be truly voluntary. This is true of both direct and indirect
funding. Virtually all of the case law addressing this issue deals with
federal funding of sectarian schools. In those cases, choices made by
individual parents and students are voluntary. If parents want their
children to be taught in a religious environment, then they may
choose to send their children to sectarian schools. This is not
necessarily true of social services. The beneficiaries of charitable
choice are all in need of some kind of social service, whether it be
shelter, food, alcohol and drug abuse treatment, etc. Because of this
social state, they may not be truly "free" to choose between social
services.
In addition, beneficiaries might not know of their right to choose.
Charitable choice does not require that a voucher recipient have a
choice of providers initially.7 9 Rather, it requires that beneficiaries
affirmatively request that they be provided with services from some
other organization." Charitable choice puts them in a position that
they might reasonably see as "obligatory."'' As Senator Simon
stated, when discussing the charitable choice provisions in TANF: "a
hungry person should not have to be subjected to a religious lecture
from a Lutheran, a Catholic, a Jew, or a Muslim before they get
177. Id. at 26. The Supreme Court has upheld indirect funding of sectarian institutions
in Simmons-Harris, Mueller, Witter, and Zobrest.
178. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818-19. See also Ackerman, supra note 5 at 28.
179. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 28.
180. Guerricagoitia, supra note 102, at 466.
181. Id.
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assistance.' ',1 2 Yet, that hungry person may have to make the choice
between receiving food and religious indoctrination, or going hungry
and avoiding religious indoctrination. To a hungry person, this is no
choice at all. Thus, there is a financial incentive to subject oneself to
indoctrination and the choice is not truly voluntary. As a result,
charitable choice does define participants by reference to religion.
c. Does it create excessive government entanglement with religion?
The final Agostini criterion, and the third prong of the Lemon
test, is whether the charitable choice legislation will lead to an
excessive entanglement between government and religion.' The
Lemon Court explained that courts should examine the character of
the institutions to be benefited, the nature of the aid provided by the
state, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious organization.'" First, the institutions to be benefited by
charitable choice legislation are faith-based organizations. Secular
organizations and religious groups that provide entirely secular
services are already eligible for federal funding. Thus, charitable
choice benefits those faith-based organizations which are not already
eligible for federal funding because they indoctrinate, worship,
proselytize, show religious symbols, etc.
Second, the nature of the aid provided by the charitable choice
program is relevant.'85 In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court found that a
one-time single purpose construction grant did not constitute
excessive entanglement.' 6  This was because there were "no
continuing financial relationships.., no annual audits and no
government analysis of... expenditures" to determine whether they
were secular or religious.8 7 Neither the House bill nor the Senate
"compromise" bill specify the kinds of aid that will be provided to
faith-based organizations. Because the bills do not restrict the aid, it
may range from one-time grants to continuous financial relationships
between religious groups and the federal government.
Finally, the resulting relationship between government and
religion will depend upon both the nature and the uses of the aid.
182. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 8501, 8529 (1996)).
183. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-34 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
613 (1971).
184. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
185. Id.
186. 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
187. Id.
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Neither bill restricts the uses of governmental aid. Federal funding
may be used to purchase supplies, construct buildings, pay salaries,
and so on. The resulting relationship between government and
religious organizations will depend on the uses of the aid. As Justice
Blackmun stated in Bowen:
Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to
determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs
and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the
First Amendment.lw... Since teachers and counselors, unlike
buildings, "are not necessarily religiously neutral, greater
governmental surveillance would be required to guarantee that
state salary aid would not in fact subsidize religious
instruction." 89
Thus, if the federal funding is paying the salaries of staff
members that counsel beneficiaries, or whose jobs are non-secular,
then there will be greater government entanglement with religion
than if the funding pays for food, because of the need for greater
surveillance.
This surveillance may take a number of different forms. Agostini
held that unannounced monthly visits by public supervisors did not
constitute excessive government entanglement.19 With regard to
auditing, if faith-based organizations segregate federal funds from
non-federal funds, then there will be no entanglement because the
government can only audit federal funds.' However, if the funds are
commingled, then the government can audit all of an organization's
funds. 92
The extent of government entanglement is also dependent on the
beneficiaries of the programs. In Tilton, the Court found that college
students are less impressionable and susceptible to religious
indoctrination than younger students, so the program giving federal
aid to church-related colleges and universities did not create an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'93 This finding
suggests that, at the very least, faith-based social programs provided
by faith-based organizations that are directed toward children, will
require a high level of surveillance, because children are
188. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 650 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
189. Id. at 651 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-88).
190. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
191. Friedman, supra note 65, at 117.
192. Id.
193. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1971).
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impressionable. However, the majority of beneficiaries of social
programs are impressionable because they are at a point in their lives
where they need assistance. Although adult beneficiaries may not be
as impressionable as children, the rationale behind counseling
programs is that the beneficiaries are impressionable enough for the
programs to change their behavior.
Regardless of the nature and use of the aid, the government will
have to monitor faith-based organizations to ensure that they do not
violate the law. H.R. 7 requires that each federally funded social
program be implemented in a manner "consistent with" the
Establishment Clause.'94 Of course, even if there was no such
provision in the legislation, charitable choice must be enacted in a
manner consistent with the Establishment Clause. "[T]he State is
constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity
is not being used for religious indoctrination." '95 Thus, either the
government agencies implementing charitable choice, or a newly-
created government agency, will have to monitor each individual
program to assure that federal funds are not being used for religious
indoctrination, and is consistent with the Establishment Clause.
It is clear that monitoring will be necessary, given the fact that
charitable choice gives federal funding to religious organizations that
currently indoctrinate too much to be eligible for existing federal
funding. Additionally, the monitoring scheme for charitable choice
will have to be larger and more complex than anything the Supreme
Court has seen before. The vast majority of Establishment Clause
cases involve federal aid to parochial schools. Most address statutes
or programs implemented by a local school board, local government,
or state government. President Bush's charitable choice initiative
involves federal funding of religious organizations on a much grander
scale. It gives federal funding to secular and faith-based
organizations that provide a wide variety of social services. The
program stretches across the country and will involve every federal,
state, and local government agency that provides funding for social
services. Not only will monitoring such a program be a bureaucratic
nightmare, but it will require a much greater level of government
entanglement than do smaller, local programs.
In Bowen, the Supreme Court found that the AFLA, which
provided counseling to unmarried, pregnant teens, did not create an
194. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 4.
195. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,480 (1973).
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excessive government entanglement with religion.196 The Court said
there was no reason to assume that grants would go to organizations
that were "pervasively sectarian."' 97 Thus, all that the government
would have to do to monitor the program would be: to review the
programs set up by grantees, review the educational materials used,
and occasionally visit clinics.'98 The Court concluded: "in our view,
this type of grant monitoring does not amount to 'excessive
entanglement,' at least in the context of a statute authorizing grants to
religiously affiliated organizations that are not necessarily
'pervasively sectarian.""99 Charitable choice is distinguishable from
Bowen because it does authorize grants to "pervasively sectarian"
organizations.2" There is nothing in the language of either bill that
restricts funding of "pervasively sectarian" organizations. Thus, more
monitoring is required than was necessary in Bowen, and the
heightened monitoring will create an excessive entanglement.
Admittedly, the excessive entanglement analysis creates a
"Catch-22. ' '20 ' The Court has recognized that "the very supervision of
the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute
invalid., 212 However, monitoring is still necessary. The fact that
charitable choice grants federal funds to faith-based organizations,
that otherwise would not receive funding because they cannot
separate their secular from sectarian activities, indicates that
monitoring is necessary. Additionally, evidence that religious leaders
such as Robertson and Reverend Falwell believe that religious groups
will use federal funds to indoctrinate, indicates the need for
monitoring. Enforcement will require government monitoring of
organizations' internal practices.2 3 Such monitoring would require
the "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance" that Lemon proscribed. °
In addition to these administrative entanglements, Agostini
stated that excessive entanglement exists where "the program might
196. 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988).
197. Id. at 616.
198. Id. at 616-17.
199. Id. at 617.
200. See discussion infra Part III.B.d.
201. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615.
202. Id.
203. Friedman, supra note 65, at 117.
204. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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increase the dangers of 'political divisiveness.' 25  This is because
"competition among religious sects for political and religious
supremacy has occasioned considerable civil strife, 'generated in large
part' by competing efforts to gain or maintain the support of
government."2 6 In Lemon, the Court found that the programs at
issue had potential for political strife because there was a "need for
continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and
larger demands as costs and populations grow., 207 As the Court in
Nyquist pointed out: "we know from long experience with both
Federal and State Governments that aid programs of any kind tend to
become entrenched, to escalate in cost, and to generate their own
aggressive constituencies. And the larger the class of recipients, the
greater the pressure for accelerated increases."2°8
It seems very likely that providing federal funds to faith-based
organizations has the potential of causing great political strife. This is
evident from the political debates over religion in public schools and
federal funding of parochial schools.2" Government agencies will
have to determine which faith-based organizations are eligible for
federal funding under the charitable choice program. If only certain
religions can meet the criteria established by the government, then
there will not be a neutral distribution of funds to all religions. The
same will be true if some religious groups refuse to comply with the
Establishment Clause, requiring that funding will have to be withheld
from them. If either of these two scenarios occur, there will be
political strife between those religious groups that receive funding
and those that do not. Finally, the fact that Robertson and Reverend
Falwell, both religious and political leaders, are outspoken opponents
of charitable choice indicates that different religious groups will likely
compete for support in the government. The resulting political strife,
205. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
413-14 (1985)).
206. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) (quoting Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947)).
207. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
208. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797.
209. See, e.g., David Kravets, Appeals Court Declares Pledge of Allegiance
Unconstitutional, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 2002, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2002/06/26/statel513EDT0109.DTL; Proposition 38.
School Vouchers. State-Funded Private and Religious Education. Public School Funding,
available at http://vote2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/text/text-titlesumm_38.htm (last visited
March 24, 2003); and Julian Guthrie, Voters Dump Vouchers, Lower Bond Hurdles;
Results Show An Abiding Commitment to Public Schools, S.F. EXAMINER Nov. 8, 2000, at
B1.
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coupled with the administrative entanglements required to monitor
the charitable choice program, will create an excessive entanglement
between government and religion.
2. Coercion
The government may not coerce anyone to participate in a
religion or religious activity.1 Charitable choice arguably does
coerce beneficiaries to participate in religious activities. To violate
the Establishment Clause, coercion "need not involve either the
forced subjection of a person to religious practices or the conditioning
of relief from punishment on attendance [to] church services.,211
"Coercion is also impermissible when it takes the form of 'subtle
coercive pressure' that interferes with an individual's 'real choice'
about whether to participate in worship or prayer." ' Proponents of
charitable choice would argue that there is no governmental coercion
because beneficiaries have the choice between faith-based
organizations and secular organizations.
In DeStefano, the Second Circuit questioned whether
participation in religious practices is really a matter of free choice
when a person chooses to seek treatment at a private alcoholic
211treatment facility that uses Alcoholics Anonymous in its program.
This doubt was supported by Supreme Court decisions holding that
clergy or student-led prayers at public high school graduations or
football games are impermissibly coercive.214 The Lee and Santa Fe
Courts stated that students are not free to avoid high school
graduation and football games because to do so would require
"'forfeiture of those intangible benefits' that accompany one's high
school experience. 21 5 Similarly, the Second Circuit stated:
The "choice" between forgoing ... alcohol treatment provided
by the State and coping with one's alcoholism without
professional assistance or with assistance at substantial personal
expense or inconvenience, on the other hand, and availing
oneself of that treatment and thereby "facing a personally
offensive religious ritual," on the other, may be no choice at
210. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587 (1992).
211. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397,412 (2d Cir. 2001).
212. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 592).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 413 (referring to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (2000)).
215. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 595).
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Like the program in DeStefano, charitable choice will certainly
amount to government coercion. Individuals in need of social
services do not really have a choice. H.R. 7 says that if beneficiaries
object to receiving services from a faith-based organization, then the
government must provide them with a secular alternative and give
them notice of this right.2 7 Realistically, however, beneficiaries may
exercise this right as often as a high school student avoids graduation
because of religious activities. Although participation is not required
in either case, both the beneficiaries of social services and high school
students are in a position where making the choice may require
relinquishing "intangible benefits." Moreover, if aid is indirect, then
participation in religious activities does not have to be voluntary."8
Thus, charitable choice amounts to government coercion because the
need for social services creates a 'subtle coercive pressure' that
interferes with a beneficiary's 'real choice' about whether to
participate in a religious activity.
3. Endorsement
Justice O'Connor interprets the "effects" prong of the Lemon
test to be a question of whether a program constitutes a government
endorsement of religion.2 9 Under that analysis, the charitable choice
initiative definitely constitutes a government endorsement of religion.
Justice O'Connor addresses endorsement as a two-part test: 1) the
purpose or intent in the act, and 2) the effect of the action.22 She
explains that courts must conduct this inquiry from the point of view
of "the hypothetical observer., 22' The question is whether a
reasonable observer would see charitable choice as a government
endorsement of religion. A reasonable observer would, in fact, see
charitable choice as an endorsement of religion.
The stated purpose for charitable choice is to end discrimination
against faith-based organizations that would like to provide social
services to the needy using federal funding. The truth is, however,
charitable choice is unnecessary to get religious groups to participate
216. Id. (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312).
217. Ackerman, supra note 5 at 3-4.
218. Id. at 4.
219. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
220. Guerricagoitia, supra note 102, at 468-69.
221. Id. at 469 (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 780 (1995)).
in providing social services. Religious groups have been active in the
social welfare system for years and have long received public
funding.222 Prominent Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant groups receive
large portions of their revenue from government sources: 65% for
Catholic charities, 75% for the Jewish Board of Family Children's
Services, and 95% for the Lutheran Social Ministries.223 However,
prior to welfare reform in 1996, these groups had to be secular in
order to receive public support, even if motivated by a religious
purpose or mission.224 Proponents of charitable choice argue that
these old rules discriminate against evangelical churches.
The foregoing suggests that charitable choice endorses religion.
"Evangelical churches are no more sectarian than the Catholic
Church, yet the Catholic Church has found a way to work effectively
within the system without losing its sense of mission., 2 6 The reason
why evangelical churches do not receive current federal funding is
because they cannot find a way to provide social services in a secular
way, not because of discrimination. Therefore, charitable choice's
goal is to encourage evangelical involvement, not just broad religious
involvement.227
Charitable choice does not treat faith-based organizations and
secular charities neutrally. Religious organizations are exempt from
regulations that are inconsistent with their religious beliefs.2 8 The
government allows faith-based organizations to give their religious
message and the House legislation allows them to discriminate in
hiring, which assures that only those who adhere to the same religious
beliefs are employed.29  This gives religious organizations an
advantage because only they are free to communicate their message
to beneficiaries.230 As an example, consider the program in Bowen
that provided federal funding for the counseling of pregnant
teenagers. The government has the authority to restrict counselors
from encouraging teens to either get an abortion, or refrain from
222. Green, supra note 155, at 35.
223. Stephen Macedo, I. The Constitution of Civil Society B. Religion and Civic
Education Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations,
And Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 417, 443 (2000).
224. Green, supra note 155, at 35.
225. Id. at 37-38.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 43.
228. Id. at 41.
229. Id. at 43.
230. Green, supra note 155, at 43.
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getting an abortion. However, faith-based organizations would be
exempt from this rule if the regulation would intrude on their
religious character. In this way, charitable choice favors faith-based
organizations.
Finally, charitable choice endorses religion because it implies
that religious groups are the proper organizations to provide
community services. It is based on the premise that a faith-based
approach is superior to a secular approach.23 ' It is also based on the
premise that the current system of providing social services is
ineffective. Because there is no evidence that allowing faith-based
organizations to indoctrinate beneficiaries while providing services
would be more effective than the current system, the choice to fund
such organizations is an endorsement of religion. A reasonable
observer can view the charitable choice program and conclude that
the government believes that it is the business of churches to care for
the needy and that perhaps the reason why so many people are needy
is because they are not getting enough church. Given that the goal of
charitable choice is to encourage evangelical involvement, it does not
treat religion and non-religion neutrally. Thus, charitable choice
implies that faith-based organizations are superior to secular
charities, and President Bush's charitable choice initiative is a
government endorsement of religion.
4. Neutrality Test
Charitable choice should be considered under the more lenient
neutrality test. The neutrality theory states that the government must
be neutral toward religion.232 For the most part, the neutrality theory
has only been applied to cases that involve both the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.233 Nevertheless, it
was the test applied in the Supreme Court's most recent
Establishment Clause case where Free Speech was not an issue.
234
According to the majority opinion in Simmons-Harris, a government
program that provides aid to religious institutions will not violate the
Establishment Clause if the program is neutral with respect to
religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
231. Id.
232. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 978.
233. See Friedman, supra note 65. Two exceptions to this are Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.
234. See Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460.
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who freely choose to direct that aid to religious organizations.235
There were several factors which the Simmons-Harris Court
considered before concluding that Ohio's school voucher program is
constitutionally permissible.First, the Court found that the voucher
program gives assistance to a broad class of citizens without reference
to religion 36 and that there were no financial incentives which
"skewed" the program toward religious institutions.237 In Simmons-
Harris, these were considered as two factors. However, in Agostini,
the Court defined the former as meaning the latter. 8  Financial
incentives which skew an individual's choice toward religious
organizations are not present if the government aid is allocated based
on neutral, secular criteria which do not favor nor disfavor religion
and the aid is available to both religious and secular beneficiaries.239
In Simmons-Harris, the Court held that there was not such a financial
interest because under the Ohio voucher program, parents who
choose to participate in the program must co-pay a portion of their
child's tuition if their child is enrolled in either a religious or non-
religious private school.2' Thus, parents have a financial incentive
against participating in the voucher program. '
Similarly, in Rosenberger, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the program at issue provided government assistance without
reference to religion.242 There, the Court considered whether the
University of Virginia's refusal to fund a religious student publication
was constitutional.243 The university authorized payment of outside
contractors for the printing costs of student publications. 2" It
withheld payments for those publications that were religious.245 The
Court held that withholding payments violated the Free Speech
Clause and that the Establishment Clause did not require the
university to exclude religious student publications.246 The Court
235. Id. at 2467.
236. Id. at 2468.
237. Id.
238. 521 U.S. 203,231 (1997).
239. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
243. Id. at 822.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 846.
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explained that the guarantee that government be neutral toward
religion is satisfied when the government extends benefits, following
neutral criteria, to recipients whose views are broad and diverse.247 In
other words, the University of Virginia created a public forum for
student publications. As long as the requirements to allow student
groups to participate in that forum were neutral, allowing religious
speech would not violate the Establishment Clause.4 '
If enacted, the charitable choice initiative certainly will provide
assistance to beneficiaries regardless of their religious beliefs.
Otherwise, the program would surely violate the Establishment
Clause, not to mention the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Nevertheless, charitable choice might still define
participants by reference to religion.29 As discussed earlier, if the
charitable choice initiative is implemented such that federal funding is
based on the number of beneficiaries served by each faith-based
organization, and the funding to religious and secular charities is
equal, then the program will provide assistance without reference to
religion."' Furthermore, if the beneficiaries of social services receive
the same benefits from religious charities as they would from secular
charities, then the charitable choice program would not be deemed to
define recipients based on religion.25 ' It is difficult to determine
whether the charitable choice program will provide assistance without
reference to religion, since it has yet to be enacted or implemented.
Nevertheless, the program may create a financial incentive for a
beneficiary to subject himself to religious indoctrination if he is in
need of social services and is not in a social state in which he can
make a truly voluntary choice.
The Simmons-Harris Court considered the fact that the Ohio
voucher program provided assistance to all schools as the second
important factor.252 This issue was previously addressed in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, where the Court considered
whether a hearing-impaired student could have a publicly paid sign-
247. Id. at 839.
248. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
249. See discussion supra Part III.B.a.ii.
250. This conclusion is based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Mitchell. See
discussion supra Part III.B.a.ii.
251. See Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1998). See also discussion supra
Part III.B.a.ii.
252. 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
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language interpreter accompany him to Catholic high school.253 The
Court held that the program was constitutionally permissible.254 It
stressed that the program was neutral because benefits were provided
neutrally to all handicapped children, without regard to the kind of
school the student attended."' The Court stated: "When the
government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian
school as part of a general program that 'is in no way skewed towards
religion,' it follows under our prior decisions that provision of that
service does not offend the Establishment Clause." '256
Unlike the program at issue in Zobrest, the charitable choice
initiative cannot possibly give governmental assistance to all those
faith-based organizations which desire it. The designated government
agency implementing charitable choice will have to establish
requirements to insure that all faith-based organizations provide
social services if they receive federal funding. Thus, it is entirely
possible that once implemented, the charitable choice program could
end up favoring some religions and not others, or not favoring
religious organizations at all if they do not meet the requirements.
Thus, it will be impossible for the charitable choice program to
provide assistance to all interested faith-based organizations, as did
the voucher program in Simmons-Harris and the funding program for
handicapped students in Zobrest.
Third, the Simmons-Harris Court rejected the argument that the
voucher program created a public perception that the government
endorsed religion.257 The Court explained that "[t]he incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of
a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits., 258 To determine whether a government
program creates the perception of government endorsement of
religion, courts look to what a reasonable observer would believe.259
In Simmons-Harris, the Court concluded that "no reasonable
253. 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
254. Id. at 13-14.
255. Id. at 10.
256. Id. (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488
(1986)).
257. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
258. Id. at 2467.
259. Id. at 2469. This was Justice O'Connor's approach in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where state
aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous
independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the
imprimatur of government endorsement."'2 6
There are several reasons why the charitable choice initiative,
unlike Ohio's school voucher system, creates a perception of
government endorsed religion.26' First, the charitable choice program
is unnecessary to encourage religious groups to participate in
providing social services. Many religious organizations already
receive federal funding to provide social services. Rather, the
charitable choice program endorses the evangelical organizations that
are currently ineligible for government aid because they refuse to
provide services in a secular manner. Second, charitable choice does
not treat faith-based organizations neutrally because they are exempt
from regulations which are inconsistent with their religious beliefs,
while secular charities must abide by all government regulations.
Third, enactment of the charitable choice initiative implies that
religious groups are the proper groups to provide social services, not
the government.
Additionally, the Court in Simmons-Harris suggested that the
hypothetical reasonable observer consider the history and context of
the school voucher program.262  After doing so, he would be
reasonable to conclude that the program was enacted as a response to
the failing school system in Cincinnati, rather than an endorsement of
religious education."' In contrast, the charitable choice initiative does
not have such a history. The stated purpose of charitable choice is to
end discrimination against religious charities applying for federal
funding. However, in reality, there is no such discrimination against
religious charities. Religious groups have long received public
funding to provide social services." It is only those religious
organizations which cannot find a way to provide social services in a
secular way that are denied federal funding. Thus, the charitable
choice initiative addresses a discrimination problem which is almost
entirely non-existent.
Furthermore, one must consider the context in which the
charitable choice initiative was introduced. The program was
260. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2468 (2002).
261. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
262. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
263. Id.
264. Green, supra note 155, at 35.
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introduced by President Bush at his Inauguration following eight
years of Democratic leadership in the White House. President Bush
is opposed to big government. Thus, a reasonable observer might
suspect that President Bush will cut government-provided social
services if given the opportunity. The charitable choice initiative
could provide such an opportunity. For example, in a recent hearing
before the House Ways and Means Committee, Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson discussed the Bush
Administration's prescription drug plan.265 In his testimony, Secretary
Thompson could not guarantee that Medicare would continue to
provide prescription drug benefits to seniors who remain in the
original fee-for-service Medicare program.2" Democrats oppose the
Administration's plan because it will give faith-based organizations
funds to provide drug treatment, while only providing prescription
drug benefits to elderly people who opt out of the traditional
Medicare program.267 In response to this plan, Representative Pete
Stark stated:
This is a president who has cut back on the safety net for the
poorest and most vulnerable people in our country. Then he's
saying: "let's take money and give it to the churches." Why
should we throw money at them while we're taking money away
from people who need it.268
The hypothetical reasonable observer could reach the same
conclusion as Representative Starks, that the President's plan is
"fanaticism to force (Bush's) right wing Christian religion on the rest
of the country. ' '16' For this reason, along with the above mentioned
reasons, the charitable choice program will create a public perception
that the government is endorsing religion.
The final factor which influenced the Simmons-Harris Court was
the majority's conclusion that there was no evidence that the voucher
program denied parents the opportunity to choose secular
educational options for their children.27° The Court stated that it did
not need to consider the fact that ninety-six percent of scholarship
265. See Robert Pear, Bush Medicare Proposal Vague on Drug Coverage, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 7, 2003, at A3; and Marc Sandalow, Rep. Stark Takes Swipe at Bush Over His Past
Alcohol Use, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2003, at A3.
266. Pear, supra note 265.
267. Sandalow, supra note 265.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2469 (2002).
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recipients chose to enroll in religious schools.27" ' This argument was
rejected in Mueller, where ninety-six percent of parents taking tax
deductions for tuition expenses paid tuition at religious schools.272
The Court explained that "[t]he constitutionality of a neutral
educational program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a
particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by
religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a
religious school." '273 This argument served as a point of contention in
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. Justice Souter stated:
There is... no way to interpret the 96.6% of current voucher
money going to religious schools as reflecting a free and
genuine choice by the families that apply for vouchers. The
96.6% reflects, instead, the fact that too few nonreligious school
desks are available and few but religious schools can afford to
accept more than a handful of voucher students.274
Because the charitable choice initiative has yet to be enacted, it is
too early for evidence regarding choice to exist. Nevertheless, there
is reason for concern that once enacted, recipients will not have a
genuine choice between religious and secular social service providers.
First, beneficiaries might not be in a position to make a truly
voluntary choice because of their social state. For example, if the
Bush Administration failed to provide prescription drug benefits to
seniors, the elderly would not truly have a choice between religious
and secular providers of drug treatment. Most likely, a senior in need
of prescription drugs will choose the provider which offers his or her
medications at the lowest costs and which requires the least amount
of effort on the part of the senior. Because this individual will be in
need of a vital service, the choice is not likely to be truly voluntary.275
Second, recipients might not have a genuinely voluntary choice
between service providers because they may not know of their right
to choose. As discussed above, the charitable choice initiative does
not initially require a choice of providers for a recipient. 276 Rather,
the program requires that a beneficiary affirmatively request that they
be offered services from another social service provider.277 The
average recipient of government-provided social services might
271. Id. at 2470.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2496 (Souter, J., dissenting).
275. See also discussion supra Part III.B.a.ii.
276. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 27.
277. Guerricagoitia, supra note 102, at 466.
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reasonably believe that he or she is obligated to receive those services
from whichever organization the government suggests, even if it is a
faith-based organization."' Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if
enacted, evidence will emerge that beneficiaries of the charitable
choice program are not making genuinely voluntary choices.:'
Finally, the enactment and implementation of the charitable
choice initiative might produce evidence to prove lack of choice
because the program itself might amount to government coercion. As
discussed above, government coercion can take the form of "'subtle
coercive pressure' that interferes with an individual's 'real choice.""'28
As in Lee v. Weisman, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
and DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., beneficiaries of
charitable choice will be in a position where making the choice
against receiving services from faith-based organizations requires
relinquishing "intangible benefits., 281' Thus, the charitable choice
initiative will produce evidence to prove lack of choice because the
program will amount to government coercion.
After reviewing all of the factors deemed important by the
Simmons-Harris Court, it is clear that the charitable choice program
is not constitutionally permissible because it does not treat faith-
based organizations neutrally. The program provides financial
incentives for beneficiaries to subject themselves to religious
indoctrination. Charitable choice cannot possibly give assistance to
all faith-based organizations that are interested in the program, as
does the Ohio voucher program. Finally, the program will create a
public perception of government endorsement of religion and it is
reasonable to conclude that it will produce evidence to prove lack of
choice. Aside from the factors considered by the Supreme Court in
Simmons-Harris, other factors weigh in favor of concluding that the
charitable choice program is not neutral towards religion.
Charitable choice does not pass constitutional muster under the
neutrality theory because it does not treat religious and secular
groups neutrally, as the programs did in Rosenberger and Zobrest. In
Rosenberger, all student publications, regardless of viewpoint, were
provided with school funding. In Zobrest, all handicapped children
received benefits, regardless of what school they attended. Under
278. Id.
279. See also discussion supra Part III.B.a.ii.
280. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587 (1992)).
281. See discussion supra Part III.B.b.
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charitable choice, faith-based organizations are not treated the same
as secular charities. Faith-based organizations are exempt from
certain regulations, if abiding by them would require the organization
to relinquish some of its religious characteristics.
For example, H.R. 7 exempts faith-based organizations from
state and local discrimination laws.2" Faith-based organizations may
discriminate in hiring on religious grounds.283  Secular charities
receiving federal funds are not exempt from these civil rights laws.
While the "compromise" Senate legislation does not include this
exemption, even without it, faith-based organizations are favored
because they are not forced to comply with regulations that are
inconsistent with their religious beliefs. For example, Pat Robertson
is concerned about "plans by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon's
Unification Church to promote its sexual abstinence programs in
public schools with government funds. ' ,21 Under charitable choice,
the federal government could decide to provide federal funding to
counsel teenagers regarding pregnancy, but forbid organizations from
promoting one option, such as abstinence or birth control, over any
other option. The Unification Church would be exempt from such a
prohibition if discussing anything but abstinence is inconsistent with
its religious beliefs. Yet, secular organizations would be bound by the
prohibition. Thus, the government does not treat faith-based
organizations and secular organizations neutrally under charitable
choice because faith-based organizations are given special
advantages.
Furthermore, in Rosenberger, the Court found safeguards that
ensured the student publication did not violate the Establishment
Clause. No such safeguards are present in the charitable choice
legislation. First, the Supreme Court pointed out that school funding
of student publications came from student activity fees, rather than a
tax. 5 The fees were not a general tax to raise revenue for the
school. 86 The Court considered this fact as an important distinction
because our Founding Fathers were concerned with levying taxes "for
282. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 3.
283. Id.
284. Lattin, supra note 141.
285. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840-41 (1995).
See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.").
286. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41.
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the direct support of a church or group of churches." '287 It appears
that this safeguard is no longer as important to the Supreme Court as
it was in 1995, when Rosenberger was decided. After all, the Ohio
school voucher program is supported by tax funds and the Court held
the program to be constitutional.m However, Justice Souter, in his
dissenting opinion, pointed out that the Court has never repudiated
or overruled Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, which held
that no tax can support any religious activities or institutions.2 In the
case of charitable choice, welfare programs are paid for by tax dollars.
Thus, this first safeguard from Rosenberger does not save charitable
choice.
Second, the Rosenberger Court found that the fact that
disbursements from the University of Virginia went to the printer,
and not directly to the student groups, was an effective safeguard.2 °
Presumably then, if federal funding for the care of the mentally ill, for
example, went directly to pharmaceutical companies that provide
faith-based organizations with necessary medication, rather than
directly to the faith-based organizations, then charitable choice might
be constitutionally permissible under the neutrality theory. However,
there are no such safeguards in either of the charitable choice bills.
Finally, the Rosenberger Court found that "'government has not
fostered or encouraged' any mistaken impression that the student
newspapers speak for the University., 291  Charitable choice does
create a mistaken impression that faith-based organizations speak for
the government.292 It endorses religion by encouraging evangelical
involvement in social services, treating faith-based organizations
differently than secular organizations, and implying that religious
groups are the proper providers of community services.9 Thus, none
of the safeguards present in the University of Virginia program exist
in charitable choice.
Charitable choice does not withstand the more lenient neutrality
approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It simply does not
287. Id.
288. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2485 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 2486. The Rosenberger Court relied heavily on this rule from Everson.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41.
290. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841.
291. Id. (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780
(1995)).
292. See discussion supra Part III.B.c.
293. See discussion supra Part III.B.c.
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treat faith-based organizations and secular organizations in a neutral
manner. Furthermore, the safeguards present in Simmons-Harris and
Rosenberger, are not present in the charitable choice legislation to
cure its unconstitutionality. Thus, even if the majority of the
Supreme Court continues to adhere to the neutrality theory,
charitable choice is unconstitutional. When charitable choice is
applied to the Lemon-Agostini constitutional framework, it becomes
clear that charitable choice does not pass constitutional muster.
There is a secular legislative purpose behind the program. However,
even if charitable choice survives the first prong of the Lemon-
Agostini test, it cannot survive the second prong. Charitable choice
has the primary effect of advancing religion. It will result in
government indoctrination because it provides federal funding to
those faith-based organizations that are currently ineligible for
funding on the basis that they indoctrinate. It defines participants by
reference to religion because it creates a financial incentive to subject
oneself to religious activities. Individuals in need of social services
are not entirely "free" to choose between religious and secular
organizations. Charitable choice will create an excessive
entanglement between government and religion because the
government will have to monitor faith-based organizations to ensure
that the program is being implemented consistent with the
Establishment Clause and the program is likely to cause political
strife. Other than the Agostini criteria for determining "effects,"
charitable choice will have the primary effect of advancing religion
because it constitutes both government coercion and government
endorsement of religion. Because charitable choice cannot survive
either the "effects" prong of the Lemon-Agostini test or the
Simmons-Harris neutrality test, it is unconstitutional.
IV. Conclusion
There is certainly a need for social services in America.
Charitable choice is an innovative answer to this need. However, as
novel as it is, charitable choice is not an appropriate way for the
government to provide social services because it violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Courts and the public
should be skeptical over whether there really is a legitimate secular
purpose for laws that benefit religion. While it is difficult to prove
that politicians have a sham secular purpose, there is historical
evidence that politicians hide their true feelings regarding other
religious groups. For example, in a taped conversation, former-
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President Richard Nixon discussed trying to reduce the Jewish
influence in government because Jews are "untrustworthy."294 He
told former Treasury Secretary John Connally that he wanted "no
more than 2 percent of the government's political appointees to be
Jewish., 295  These statements were made in 1972, meaning that
President Nixon's true feelings regarding Jews were kept secret for
thirty years. Because it is virtually impossible to know a politician's
true purpose behind any piece of legislation, and because politicians
are only human and are bound to hold beliefs that should be kept
secret, courts and the public should be skeptical of the purpose of
programs like charitable choice. This skeptical view of human nature
is why the Establishment Clause exists in the first place.
Despite the lack of evidence indicating a sham secular purpose,
charitable choice still violates the Establishment Clause. Regardless
of whether the Supreme Court is comprised of separationists or
proponents of the neutrality theory, charitable choice does not pass
constitutional muster. It cannot survive the Lemon-Agostini test
because it has the primary effect of advancing religion. Nor can it
satisfy the requirements of the neutrality theory because charitable
choice is not neutral towards faith-based and secular organizations.
As a result, with respect to charitable choice, the wall between church
and state must remain strong and impenetrable.
294. George Lardner, Jr., Nixon Defended Envoy's Groping; 1972 Tapes Also Reveal
Talk of a Justice Dept. 'Full of Jews', WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at A2.
295. Id.
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